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Affect instability, a core symptom of several major mental illnesses, contributes to high levels of 
subjective distress and impaired self-care abilities. The findings of previous studies have shown 
that, in asymptomatic samples, the organizational properties of the self-concept impact short- 
term affect regulation. In this study, that work is extended to examine the association between 
the organizational properties of the self-concept and instability of affect in adults with a major 
mental illness. Subjects were 19 adults with a major mental illness (clinical) and 10 asymptomat- 
ic adults. Zajonc's card-sorting task was used to measure two organizational properties: (a) 
differentiation-the number of attributes included in the self-concept, and (b) unity-the degree 
of interdependence among the attributes. An experience sampling procedure was used to obtain 
50 measures of affect across a 10-day period. The clinical group experienced more instability of 
negative affects than the asymptomatic group. Furthermore, the clinical group had lower differ- 
entiation and higher unity of the self-concept than the asymptomatic controls, although both 
organizational properties were related to education. In the total sample, differentiation was not 
related to instability of affect. Unity accounted for 21% of the variance in instability of negative 
affect. 0 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Affect instability, rapid and extreme shifts 
from baseline to high levels of negative affect, is 
a core symptom of several major mental illnesses 
including borderline, schizotypal, and histrionic 
personality disorders, eating disorders, and atypi- 
cal depression (Cowdry, Gardner, O'Leary, 
Leibenluft, & Rubinow, 1991; Ellison & Adler, 
1990; Gunderson, Zanarini, & Kisiel, 1991; 
Rodin, Silberstein, & Striegel-Moore, 1984; 
Siever, Klar, & Coccaro, 1985; Striegel-Moore, 
Silberstein, & Rodin, 1986). Unlike the affect 
dysregulation associated with major mood disor- 
ders in which people experience stable levels of 
sadness or elation over a period of days or even 
weeks, affect states in these clinical populations 
are highly volatile with extreme changes occur- 
ring within a period of only a few hours. Individ- 
uals with these disorders tend to be highly sen- 
sitive to stressors, particularly interpersonal criti- 
cism and rejection, and react with abrupt in- 
creases in anger, anxiety, and despair. 
In addition to the obvious subjective distress 
associated with affect instability, the symptom is 
of concern to psychiatric nurses because it inter- 
feres with the consistent enactment of a number 
of fundamental self-care behaviors. Since indi- 
viduals with affect instability tend to express or 
relieve their emotional distress by engaging in 
impulsive and sometimes self-destructive behav- 
iors, their ability to ensure their own safety is 
often severely compromised (Ellison & Adler, 
1990). Furthennore, the frequent and often un- 
expected high levels of negative affect and the 
subsequent expression of those feelings seriously 
impair the development and maintenance of 
meaningful interpersonal relationships. Yet de- 
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spite the serious consequences of affect insta- 
bility on the individual’s health and well-being, 
little is currently known about the mechanisms 
underlying affect regulation in these clinical 
populations and, therefore, few theory-driven 
intervention strategies are available. In this 
study, the role of the self-concept in affect reg- 
ulation was explored. More specifically, the 
purpose was to examine the organizational 
properties of the self-concept in adults with a 
diagnosed mental illness that is associated with 
dysregulated affect and to explore the relation- 
ship between the organizational properties and 
affect instability. 
A number of theoretical models suggest that 
the person’s self-concept plays an important role 
in the regulation of affect (see Beck, 1987; Beck 
& Freeman, 1990; Kernberg, 1975; Lazarus, 
1984; Markus & Wurf, 1987). In these models, 
the self-concept is defined as a complex and 
multifaceted knowledge structure that consists 
of a stable and enduring collection of images, 
beliefs, and attitudes about the self (Beck, 1967; 
Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; Horowitz, 1977; Ker- 
nberg, 1975; Markus, 1977). The individual con- 
ceptions of the self that comprise the self-concept 
are established in memory during the course of 
development. They reflect the categorizations 
and evaluations of one’s physical and behavioral 
characteristics made both by the self and others 
in the social environment. As a total unit, the 
self-concept is viewed as a fundamental compo- 
nent of the cognitive system that functions as 
an interpretative framework enabling rapid and 
efficient processing of internal and external 
stimuli. 
Some theorists suggest that the content of self- 
conceptions is key to understanding individual 
differences in emotional responses to stimuli. In 
these theories, the role of the self-concept in de- 
termining the type of affect experienced is em- 
phasized. For example, Lazarus (1984) posits 
that affect states such as sadness or anger are the 
outcome of a series of judgments made about the 
self-relevance of a stimulus and about one’s ca- 
pacity to effectively respond. Similarly, Beck 
(1987) suggests that the sustained sad mood and 
feeling of hopelessness associated with depres- 
sion stem from negative beliefs about the self that 
bias and distort the processing of information 
from the environment. In these models, the self- 
concept serves as the framework for evaluating 
the importance of the stimulus and attributing 
meaning to it. 
Other theorists who specifically address affect 
instability focus on characteristics of the way in- 
formation about the self is organized in memory 
(Horowitz, 1987; Kernberg, 1975; Linville, 
1985; 1987; Masterson, 1990). In these theories 
it is suggested that people vary according to the 
number of self-conceptions included in the self- 
concept and the extent to which these individual 
units of information are interrelated. Some theo- 
ries, particularly those from the psychoanalytic 
tradition, emphasize the value of a unified and 
integrated collection of self-conceptions, where- 
as more contemporary, empirically based theories 
within the field of social psychology suggest that 
the availability in memory of many independent 
self-conceptions is associated with lower levels 
of emotional responsivity to stressors (Stein & 
Markus, 1994). 
The psychoanalytically based object relation 
theorists suggest that affect instability, partic- 
ularly in adults with severe personality disorders, 
is caused by a lack of integration of the self- 
concept (Jacobson, 1964; Horowitz, 1977; Kern- 
berg, 1975). According to this perspective, the 
self-concept is formed during the first 2 to 3 years 
of life as the child learns that the self is a separate 
and autonomous agent (Mahler, Pine, & Berg- 
man, 1975). During this process of separation 
and individuation, the formation of the self- 
concept occurs in predictable stages moving from 
a collection of fragmented and unrelated images 
of discreet aspects of the self to an organized, 
coherent, and unified collection of images that 
reflects the whole person. Failure of the interper- 
sonal environment to respond appropriately to the 
child’s needs around separation and individuation 
interferes with the integration of the self- 
conceptions, and the self-concept remains a col- 
lection of discreet images that lack coherence and 
organization (Horowitz, 1977; Jacobson, 1964; 
Kernberg, 1966, 1984). According to these theo- 
rists, the lack of integration of the self-concept 
leads to affect instability because each time a 
self-relevant stimulus is encountered, a distinctly 
separate conception of the self and related self- 
evaluative feelings are activated. Since each con- 
ception of the self is distinct and isolated from the 
others, no other opposite-valenced conception of 
the self is available to modulate or offset the cur- 
rently activated perspective of the self. Conse- 
quently, affective reactions to stimuli are ex- 
treme, behavioral responses erratic, and the self 
is subjectively experienced as a series of dis- 
jointed, unrelated states. 
The idea that the organization of information 
within the self-concept impacts emotional reac- 
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tivity to stimuli also has been explored within the 
field of cognitive social psychology. However, 
the findings of these studies offer a preliminary 
challenge to the object relations theory that a lack 
of integration of the self-conceptions contributes 
to instability of affect. Building on the spreading 
activation model of memory, investigators pos- 
ited that the availability in memory of many inde- 
pendent conceptions of the self may actually 
serve as an internal resource that limits the nega- 
tive consequences of a self-relevant threat (Dixon 
& Baumeister, 1991; Linville, 1985, 1987; Nie- 
denthal, Setterlund, & Wherry, 1992). According 
to the spreading activation model, phenomena 
are represented in memory as concepts or nodes 
that are linked together to form a rich and com- 
plex network (Collins & Loftus, 1975). Concepts 
that are semantically similar or related to each 
other in other ways are thought to be linked in 
memory such that activation of one node readily 
spreads to the other. In contrast, objects that are 
not related do not have direct linkages between 
them and, therefore, activation of one node will 
not affect the other. Extending this theoretical 
framework to the self-conceptions, investigators 
posited that in cases in which the person has few 
conceptions of the self that are highly interre- 
lated, and, hence, tightly interconnected in mem- 
ory, an event that triggers a negative evaluation of 
one aspect of the self will quickly spread 
throughout the entire structure and result in a 
generalized sense of self-dissatisfaction and neg- 
ative mood. In contrast, the same threat to a sin- 
gle self-conception in a more fully elaborated and 
less unified self-concept will be more contained 
and negative feelings limited to a smaller propor- 
tion of the total self-concept (Niedenthal et al., 
1992). 
The findings of a series of studies with asymp- 
tomatic college-aged samples lend support to 
the theoretical predictions. In one study, sub- 
jects with many independent self-conceptions 
included in the self-concept and those with 
relatively fewer more interdependent self- 
conceptions were given false feedback about 
their performance on an intelligence test (see Lin- 
ville, 1985). Some subjects were told that they 
scored above average on the test while others 
were told that they scored significantly lower 
than their peers. Subjects’ mood and self- 
evaluations were measured both before the intel- 
ligence test was given and after the feedback was 
received. Subjects with many independent con- 
ceptions of the self articulated in memory experi- 
enced less extreme emotional reactions to feed- 
back than those with fewer, more interdependent 
conceptions of the self. 
Since Linville’s original work, a number of 
investigators have both replicated the findings 
(see Campbell, Chew, Scratchley, 1991; Nie- 
denthal et al., 1992 for examples) and extended 
the work to examine other emotional and behav- 
ioral responses to self-relevant threats. For exam- 
ple, investigators have shown that individuals 
with many independent attributes included in the 
self-concept are more receptive to feedback that 
challenges their established view of themselves 
(Stein, 1994). and experience less emotional dis- 
tress and physical illness in response to stressful 
events (Linville, 1987) than those with fewer in- 
dependent self-conceptions. 
Although the link between the organizational 
properties of the self-concept and affect regulation 
has been documented in asymptomatic college- 
aged young adults, no studies have been done to 
explore the linkage in adults who experience dys- 
regulated affect. Identification of properties of the 
self-concept that impact affect regulation in clini- 
cal populations has important implications for 
nursing practice. Self-concept disturbances are 
broadly recognized within the discipline of nurs- 
ing as an important focus for intervention (Car- 
penito, 1992; Roy & Andrews, 1991). However, 
to date, most nursing interventions have tended to 
focus narrowly on one aspect of the self-concept: 
global self-esteem (Stein, 1995). Focusing on the 
organizational properties of the self-concept holds 
the potential for expanding nursing’s focus on the 
self-concept beyond self-esteem to other impor- 
tant dimensions of the self-concept. If specific 
deviations in the organizational properties of the 
self-concept can be identified, and the mecha- 
nisms that link the deviations to affect dysregula- 
tion understood, more refined, theoretically-based 
intervention strategies can be developed. 
Consistent with other contemporary models, 
the self-concept was defined in this study as a 
complex memory structure that is comprised of 
multiple self-conceptions or attributes (Cantor & 
Kihlstrom, 1987; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984; 
Markus, 1977). Two organizational properties of 
the self-concept were addressed: (a) differen- 
tiation-the number of attributes included in the 
self-concept, and (b) unity-the degree of inter- 
dependence among the attributes. Based on the 
findings of studies with asymptomatic samples, it 
was predicted that adults with a major mental 
illness would have lower differentiation and high- 
er unity of the self-concept than asymptomatic 
adults and that these two properties of the self- 
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Two groups of subjects participated in this study, 
the clinical group (n = 19) and the asymptom- 
atic control group ( n  = 10). The clinical group 
included adults with either a primary psychiatric 
diagnosis of borderline personality disorder 
(BPD) (n = 15) or anorexia nervosa (AN) (n = 
4). These two disorders were selected for study 
because: (a) instability of affect is recognized as 
an important symptom of both disorders (Cowdry 
et al., 1991; Goodsitt, 1983), and (b) the severity 
of the disorders are comparable in that both are 
associated with severe impairments in self-care 
abilities that often necessitate inpatient hospital- 
ization. 
Clinical subjects were recruited from three in- 
patient psychiatric units at local hospitals. The 
Diagnostic Inventory for Borderlines (DIB) 
(Gunderson, Kolb, & Austin, 1981) and a clini- 
cal history were used to establish primary di- 
agnosis and group placement. To establish a 
diagnosis of BPD, the individual had to meet 
DSM-III-R (American Psychological Associa- 
tion, 1987) criteria for BPD and score 7 or above 
on the DIB. Similarly, to establish a diagnosis of 
AN, the individual had to meet DSM-III-R crite- 
ria for AN and score 5 or below on the DIB. 
Individuals were considered asymptomatic if 
they had a negative history for psychiatric disor- 
ders and scored 5 or below on the DIB. Addition- 
al criteria for participation in the two groups in- 
cluded: (a) no history of organic, developmental, 
and chronic psychotic disorders, and (b) literacy 
in English. 
The DIB is a semistructured interview that fo- 
cuses on five areas of functioning (Gunderson & 
Kolb, 1978). Scores range from 0 to 10 with a 
score of 7 or above necessary for the diagnosis of 
BPD. Discriminate and known group techniques 
have been used to support the validity of the mea- 
sure (Soloff & Ulrich, 1981). 
The DIB was designed to be administered by a 
skilled psychiatric clinician (Cornell, Silk, 
Ludolph, & Lohr, 1983). In this study, approx- 
imately half of the subjects in the Clinical group 
(n = 8) were recruited from an ongoing Person- 
ality Disorders Research Project. For these sub- 
jects the DIB was administered by a member of 
the Personality Disorders research team prior to 
entry into this study. An acceptable level of inter- 
rater reliability for the team was established (kap- 
pa = 3 0 )  (Baker, Silk, Weston, Nigg, & Lohr, 
1992). For all other subjects the DIB was admin- 
istered by the principal investigator, who was 
trained in the administration of the DIB. The in- 
vestigator was considered a reliable interviewer 
after concurrently rating five patients with a 
member of the Personality Disorders research 
team and successfully establishing: (a) the same 
group placement, and (b) a total DIB score that 
was within one scale point of that assigned by the 
experienced interviewer. 
Sixteen (84%) of the subjects in the clinical 
group and nine (90%) asymptomatic subjects 
were female. The mean age was 27.3 (SD = 6.9) 
years for the clinical group and 29.3 (SD = 7.0) 
years for the asymptomatic group (p = ns). Sub- 
jects in the asymptomatic group had higher level 
of education (M = 17.2, SD = 2.5) than those in 
the clinical group (M = 14.3, SD = 3. I ) ,  t(27) = 
-2.57, p < .02. In the clinical group, 11 sub- 
jects were single, 2 married, and 6 were di- 
vorced; in the asymptomatic group, 4 subjects 
were single and 6 were married. 
Forty-two percent of the clinical subjects (n = 
8) were on no psychotropic medication at the 
time of data collection. Of the 58% (n  = 11) on 
psychotropic medications, four (21%) were on a 
mood stabilizing drug, two (1 1%) were on anti- 
depressants, two (1  1 %) were on an antipsychotic 
medication and three (16%) were receiving a 
combination of antidepressant, mood stabilizing, 
and antipsychotic drugs. Of the 1 1  subjects on 
medication, 8 had started the medication during 
the current hospitalization, and 3 had begun the 
medication prior to admission. 
Measures 
Differentiation and unity of the seu- 
concept, a card-sorting task developed by Za- 
jonc (1960) to measure the organizational proper- 
ties of cognitive structures, was used to measure 
differentiation and unity of the self-concept. This 
measure consists of three tasks, two of which 
were used for this study. First, subjects were giv- 
en a stack of blank index cards and were asked to 
write down all the attributes that are important to 
who they are. Subjects were asked to write only 
one self-defining attribute on each card and were 
encouraged to use as many or as few cards as 
necessary to thoroughly describe themselves. 
Subjects were given as much time as needed to 
complete the task. Next, subjects were asked to 
consider each of their attributes separately and 
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to “identify all other attributes that would change 
if the targeted attribute was somehow changed, 
absent, or untrue of you.” 
Responses to the two tasks were used to com- 
pute the differentiation and unity scores. Differ- 
entiation refers to the number of attributes in- 
cluded in the self-concept and is computed by 
counting the number of attributes generated. Uni- 
ty refers to the degree of interdependence among 
the attributes included in the self-concept. Re- 
sponses to the second task were used to construct 
a dependency matrix such that when attribute Aj 
caused a change in attribute Ai a value of 1 was 
assigned and when no change in Ai occurred a 
value of 0 was assigned. The total dependency of 
an element was calculated by summing the row 
entries and the total dependency of self-concept 
was calculated by summing the dependencies 
across all attributes (see formula). To compare 
the degree of unity across self-concepts of vary- 
ing levels of differentiation, the measure of unity 
was normalized by dividing the sum by the total 
number of possible dependencies of the structure. 
Possible values for the unity measure range from 
0 to 1.0. 
n 
2 dependency (A i )  
n(n - 1 )  
I =  1 
Unity = 
The results of previous studies provide evi- 
dence to support the validity of the card-sorting 
technique as a measure of differentiation and uni- 
ty of the self-concept. To address the competing 
hypothesis that the card-sorting task measures 
ability and motivation to communicate one’s 
thoughts in writing rather than the organizational 
properties of the self-concept, Stein (1994) ex- 
amined the relationship between differentiation 
and unity of the self-concept and written fluency. 
A sample of 15 1 college-aged men and women 
were asked to write an essay about a photograph 
they were shown and the number of words writ- 
ten was used as an indicator of written fluency. 
The results of the study showed no relationship 
between written fluency and the differentiation 
and unity scores. A second finding of the study- 
that differentiation and unity scores were not re- 
lated to college entry examinations (i.e.. ACT 
and SAT scores) provides evidence to suggest 
that the variability in the differentiation and unity 
scores was not related to intelligence. 
In a second study, a criterion-related approach 
was used to address the validity of the card-sort 
measure. Stein (1990) examined the relationship 
between differentiation and unity scores derived 
from the Zajonc card-sorting task and Linville’s 
(1987) Self-Complexity measure. The Linville 
measure provides a single score that represents 
the number of independent, nonoverlapping 
conceptions included in the self-concept with 
higher scores reflecting more independent self- 
conceptions articulated in memory. The results 
revealed an expected positive correlation between 
the Linville Self-Complexity and differentiation 
scores, r(36) = .51, p = .001, and an expected 
negative correlation with the unity score, r(36) = 
Finally, Stein and Markus ( 1  990) found pre- 
dicted differences between individuals who rated 
a domain of self-knowledge as central to their 
self-definition and those who did not view the 
domain as core. Individuals who rated the do- 
main of independence as centrally self-defining 
tended to have higher differentiation and unity 
scores than those who did not view the domain as 
self-defining. Furthermore, to rule out a compet- 
ing hypothesis of response style bias, in this 
study the two groups of subjects also completed 
the card-sorting task while considering an unfa- 
miliar inanimate object. As expected, when de- 
scribing the unfamiliar object, no group differ- 
ences were found in differentiation or unity 
scores. 
A moderate level of test-retest reliability has 
been shown for the differentiation measure at 
2-week, r(36) = .26, p = .06, and 18-month, 
434) = .49, p < .01, intervals. A high level of 
test-retest reliability was found for the unity 
measure at 2 weeks, r(36) = .64, p < .001, and a 
moderate level at 18 months, r(34) = .34, p < 
.05 (Stein, 1990). 
In order to examine in- 
stability of affect, it was necessary to measure 
affect states repeatedly over time. The experi- 
ence sampling method (Hormuth, 1986; Larson 
& Csikszentmihalyi, 1983) was used to obtain 
multiple measures of affect during the person’s 
everyday activities. Subjects were asked to wear 
an alarm watch for a period of 10 days. The 
watch was set to signal the subject five times 
daily at random intervals between the hours of 9 
a.m. and 9 p.m. During the experience sampling 
period subjects carried a notebook of diaries with 
them. At each signal, subjects were instructed to 
immediately complete a one-page diary type 
questionnaire that included a measure of affect. 
The Self-Report Affect Circumplex Scale (Lar- 
sen & Diener, 1991) was used to measure insta- 
bility of affect. This measure is based on the cir- 
cumplex model of affect in which it is posited that 
two main dimensions are underlying the majority 
.39, p = .01. 
lnstubility of affect. 
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of affect states: hedonic valence (pleasant and 
unpleasant dimension) and activation (high and 
low energy dimension). Four additional dimen- 
sions of affect are identified that reflect combina- 
tions of the two main dimensions. They include: 
(a) activated-pleasant, (b) unactivated-pleasant, 
(c) activated-unpleasant, and, (d) unactivated- 
unpleasant affects. Subjects are asked to rate 48 
mood adjectives on a 5-point scale according to 
“how you are feeling now.” Eight affect scales, 
each consisting of six adjectives, are included in 
the measure; Cronbach alpha coefficients for the 
scales ranged from .70 to .94. 
For this study, the within-subject standard de- 
viation across the repeated measures of the affect 
state was used as an index of instability of the 
affect. Six of the affect scales derived from the 
Self-Report Affect Circumplex Scale were used 
to compute two main outcome variables: insta- 
bility of positive affects and instability of nega- 
tive affects. To compute the individual’s insta- 
bility of positive affects score, the within-subject 
standard deviation across the repeated mea- 
sures of the affect was computed for each of the 
pleasant affect scales including the pleasant, 
activated-pleasant, and unactivated-pleasant 
scales. The individual’s three pleasant affect stan- 
dard deviation scores were then summed to com- 
pute an instability of positive affects score. The 
individual’s positive affects instability score was 
used to calculate a group mean positive affects 
instability score. Similarly, for an individual’s in- 
stability of negative affects score, the within- 
subject standard deviation across the multiple 
measures of the affect was computed for each of 
the unpleasant affect scales including the un- 
pleasant, activated-unpleasant, and unactivated- 
unpleasant scales. The individual’s three un- 
pleasant affect standard deviation scores then 
were summed to compute an instability of nega- 
tive affects score. The individual’s negative af- 
fects instability score was used to compute the 
group mean instability score. The high activation 
and low activation scales were not addressed in 
this study. Two subjects, both in the clinical 
group, failed to complete more than five of the 
repeated measures of affect. Consequently, their 
data were dropped from all analyses of the affect 
data. 
Procedures 
All subjects completed a written informed con- 
sent before participating in the study. For all sub- 
jects, except the BPD subjects who were re- 
cruited from the Personality Disorder Project, the 
DIB was administered by the investigator. To en- 
sure that acute cognitive changes associated with 
starvation did not confound measurement of the 
study variables, individuals with anorexia ner- 
vosa were recruited into the study after they had 
successfully completed nutrition classes and a 
nutrition examination. These two components of 
the treatment protocol indicate an ability to pro- 
cess and retain complex information and, there- 
fore, were used as markers of an acceptable level 
of cognitive functioning. 
Approximately 3 days after completing the 
DIB interview, subjects completed a packet of 
written questionnaires that included the card- 
sorting task. Subjects then were oriented to the 
experience sampling procedure. A member of the 
research team met with the subject approximately 
every 3 days during the experience sampling peri- 
od to reset alarm times and to collect completed 
diaries. Subjects were paid $40 for their partici- 
pation. 
Each subject was signaled a total of 50 times 
over the 10-day period. All subjects in the clini- 
cal group began the experience sampling during 
inpatient hospitalization. For those subjects who 
were discharged before the end of the experience 
sampling, data collection continued during their 
return to community living. For the clinical 
group, 54% of the diaries were completed during 
inpatient hospitalization. Response rate for di- 
aries was 74% for the clinical group and 89% for 
the asymptomatic group. 
RESULTS 
One main assumption underlying this study was 
that adults with either a borderline personality 
disorder or anorexia nervosa experience more in- 
stability of affect than asymptomatic adults. To 
examine this assumption, group differences in in- 
stability of positive and negative affects were ex- 
amined using a Student’s t test. As expected, the 
clinical group experienced significantly more in- 
stability of negative affects across the repeated 
measures (M = 2.32, SD = 0.57) than the 
asymptomatic group (M = 1.13, SD = 0.38), 
r(25) = 5.85, p < .001. However, the two 
groups did not differ in instability of positive af- 
fects (Clinical: M = 1.81, SD = 1.12; asymp- 
tomatic: M = 2.16, SD = 0.59). 
As a first step in exploring the role of the orga- 
nizational properties of the self-concept in insta- 
bility of mood, the relationship between group 
membership and differentiation and unity scores 
was examined using simple regression analyses. 
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Table 1. Results of Regression Analyses 
of Organlzatlonal Properties on Group Education 
































Note. Beta equals standardized regression coefficient. 
' p  5 .05. " p  5 .01. 
In the first analysis, differentiation was regressed 
on group, which was entered as a dummy vari- 
able. As shown in Table 1,  group was a signifi- 
cant predictor of differentiation of the self- 
concept, accounting for 14% of the explained 
variance in differentiation scores. Because of the 
small sample included in this study, the amount 
of shrinkage or decrease in explained variance 
between this sample and the true population was 
considered (Prescott, 1987). For this model the 
adjusted R* was 1 I % ,  suggesting that the esti- 
mated relationship between group and differen- 
tiation can be expected to shrink by 3% in the 
population. In the second analysis, unity of the 
self-concept was regressed on group. Group was 
a significant predictor of unity, accounting for 
19% of the variance in unity scores. For this 
model the adjusted R2 was 16%. For both mod- 
els, the standardized regression coefficients and 
the r-value for the predictor variable are shown in 
Table I .  For the clinical group, the mean differen- 
tiation score was 25.8 (SD = 11.6) and the mean 
unity score was 0.30 (SD = 0.19). For the 
asymptomatic group the mean differentiation 
score was 35.2 (SD = 10.8) and the mean unity 
score was 0.13, (SD = 0. I I). 
Because group differences were found in level 
of education, the relationship between the organi- 
zational properties and level of education also 
was examined using simple regression analyses. 
Education accounted for 29% of the variability in 
differentiation of the self-concept (adjusted R2 = 
26%) and 18% of the variance in unity of the self- 
concept (adjusted R2 = 14%). Standardized re- 
gression coefficients and t-values for both models 
are shown in Table 1. 
Finally, to examine the relative contribution of 
group and education on the organizational prop- 
erties of the self-concept, two multiple regression 
analyses were completed. Education and group 
were entered into these analyses simultaneously 
with each predictor variable tested for signifi- 
cance while the effects of the other variable were 
controlled; the results are shown in Table 1. The 
two-predictor model accounted for 31% of the 
variance in differentiation scores (adjusted R2 = 
26%), but in this model only education was a 
significant predictor. For unity of the self- 
concept, the two-predictor model accounted for 
25% of the explained variance (adjusted R2 = 
19%), but neither group nor education was a sig- 
nificant predictor. 
To examine the role of differentiation and unity 
of the self-concept in predicting instability of af- 
fect, two simultaneous regression analyses were 
completed. In these analyses each of the organi- 
zational properties was tested for significance 
while the effects of the other were controlled. As 
shown in Table 2, a multiple regression analysis 
with differentiation and unity used to predict in- 
stability of positive affect was not statistically 
significant. Furthermore, a multiple regression 
analysis with differentiation and unity used to 
predict instability of negative affect revealed that 
differentiation of the self-concept was not a sig- 
nificant predictor. However, unity of the self- 
concept was statistically significant, accounting 
for 27% of the variance in instability of negative 
affects (adjusted R2 = 21%). 
Because of the relationship found between uni- 
Table 2. Results of Multiple Regression Analyses 
of Instability of Affect on Differentiation and Unity 
Criterion/Predictor Beta t F 
Affect Instability-Positive 
Differentiation 0.31 1.40 
Unity 0.11 0.51 0.99 
Differentiation 0.01 0.03 
Unity 0.52 2.66*' 4.36* 
Education 0.08 0.36 
Unity 0.01 0.06 0.07 
Affect Instability-Negative 
Affect Instability-Positive 
Affect lnstabi lity-Negative 
Education -0.09 -0.45 
Unity 0.48 2.47' 4.50' 
Note. Beta equals standardized regression coefficient. 
' p  5 .05. " p  5 .01. 
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ty of the self-concept and education, two addi- 
tional regression analyses were completed to ex- 
amine the effects of education on instability of 
affect. In these analyses level of education and 
unity of the self-concept were entered simul- 
taneously into the equations. For both the posi- 
tive and negative affect states, level of education 
was not a reliable predictor of instability of af- 
fect. However, unity remained a significant pre- 
dictor of instability of negative affect (see Table 2 
for standardized regression coefficients). 
DISCUSSION 
Because of the small sample size, the results of 
this study must be viewed as preliminary. How- 
ever, the findings do lend preliminary support to 
the hypothesis that the organizational properties 
of the self-concept are an important factor con- 
tributing to the affect instability experienced by 
adults with certain major mental illnesses. As ex- 
' pected, the clinical sample did report signifi- 
cantly more instability of negative affects over 
the 10-day period. Furthermore, in the total sam- 
ple, unity of the self-concept was a significant 
predictor of instability of negative affects. Indi- 
viduals with a highly unified or interdependent 
collection of self-defining attributes experienced 
significantly more variability in negative affect 
states over the experience sampling period than 
those with a less unified self-stmcture. 
These results are consistent with the hypothe- 
sis, put forth by Linville (1985), that the avail- 
ability in memory of a collection of discreet, un- 
related conceptions of the self serves as an 
internal resource that limits the negative affective 
consequences of an event and, thereby, contrib- 
utes to emotional stability. Apparently, when the 
self-concept consists of a collection of indepen- 
dent self-conceptions, a threat to any single as- 
pect is contained within that domain. The many 
other self-conceptions remain unaffected and, 
therefore, can function to stabilize self-feelings 
and affect. From this view, the collection of inde- 
pendent self-conceptions buffers the impact of 
any threat to self and enables the individual to 
maintain a more constant level of affect. In con- 
trast, when the self-concept is a highly unified, 
cohesive cluster of self-conceptions, a threat to a 
single aspect of the self may spread throughout 
the entire self-concept. In this case there may be 
fewer uninvolved dimensions of the self available 
to offset the threat and stabilize self-feelings and 
affect and, therefore, rapid and marked increases 
in negative affect can be expected. 
It is interesting to note that differentiation of 
the self-concept was not a reliable predictor of 
instability of affect. Consistent with the findings 
of other studies (see Linville, 1987), the number 
of attributes alone did not affect the amount of 
fluctuation in affect states. This finding points to 
the fact that simply knowing the number of attri- 
butes articulated in memory provides little infor- 
mation about the structure underlying the array. 
Although an individual may report a large num- 
ber of self-defining attributes, those attributes 
may be tightly clustered around a single underly- 
ing dimension and, therefore, represent one rath- 
er than several unique components of the self- 
system. 
One unexpected finding of this study was that 
the organizational properties of the self-concept 
were associated with education. Contrary to the 
research hypothesis, the results showed that 
when the effects of group membership and educa- 
tion were considered together, only education 
was a significant predictor of differentiation of 
the self-concept. For unity, both group member- 
ship and education together accounted for a sta- 
tistically significant proportion of the variance, 
but neither variable was a significant predictor 
when the effects of the other were controlled. 
Although the failure to detect a statistically sig- 
nificant relationship between group membership 
and the organizational properties, particularly 
unity, may have been due to the small sample, 
these results raise important questions about the 
source of variability in the self-concept. 
One competing hypothesis that must be con- 
sidered is that the observed variability in differen- 
tiation and unity of the self-concept is an epi- 
phenomena, reflecting differences in written 
fluency associated with education rather than true 
differences in the self-concept. Several pieces of 
empirical evidence are available to challenge this 
rival hypothesis. First, the findings of other stud- 
ies in which the validity of the Zajonc card- 
sorting measure was examined have shown that 
the organizational properties of the self-concept 
are not related to ability or motivation to express 
oneself in writing (Stein, 1994). Stein and 
Markus (1990) showed that expected group dif- 
ferences in differentiation and unity of the self- 
concept were not found when the subjects de- 
scribed an unknown inanimate object. These last 
findings are particularly relevant to this rival hy- 
pothesis because, if observed differences in the 
self-concept were simply an epiphenomena re- 
flecting differences in ability to articulate and 
written fluency, differences should be evidenced 
in all domains, not just when describing oneself. 
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Second, the findings that (a) unity of the self- 
concept was a significant predictor of instability 
negative affect and (b) education was unrelated to 
instability of negative affect lend support to the 
idea that unity of the self-concept is a distinct 
variable, not just an alternative expression of lev- 
el of education. 
A second, and perhaps more plausible, hy- 
pothesis is that the organizational properties of 
the self-concept are, indeed, influenced by edu- 
cation. Higher levels of education may be associ- 
ated with increased opportunities to engage in 
diverse behavioral domains. Since conceptions of 
the self are constructed through experience and 
interaction with the environment (Cantor, 1990; 
Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; Markus, 1977), indi- 
viduals with a richer and more diverse set of ex- 
periences may have more independent concep- 
tions of themselves articulated in memory. For 
example, an individual with a high level of edu- 
cation may be more likely to have a professional 
job with multiple and complex role demands that 
could lead to a more diverse collection of self- 
conceptions even within the single domain of 
work. In contrast, individuals with lower levels 
of education may have, for financial and a variety 
of other reasons, a more limited range of interests 
and experiences. In this case, there would be few- 
er behavioral domains that the individual could 
claim as self-definitional and the domains that are 
considered part of the self may be more closely 
interrelated. 
Another interesting finding to note is that de- 
spite the fact that 60% of the clinical sample was 
on at least one psychotropic medication, their 
mean level of instability of negative affect was 
approximately double the level reported by the 
asymptomatic subjects. This finding is consistent 
with other psychopharmaceutical studies in 
which it has been shown that psychotropic medi- 
cations have only a small effect on instability of 
affect (Gruber, Janowsky, Mandell, Risch, & 
Huey, 1984; Lucas, Gardner, Wolkowitz, & 
Cowdry, 1987). Although clearly there is evi- 
dence available to support the view that biolog- 
ical mechanisms play a role in affect instability 
(see Ellison & Adler, 1990; Soloff, 1987; Soloff, 
Cornelius, & George, 1991), the findings, when 
taken together with the biologically based stud- 
ies, raise the question of whether cognitive mech- 
anisms also may be involved. 
As already mentioned, a limitation of this 
study is the small sample. Replications with larg- 
er and more diverse groups of adults who experi- 
ence marked instability of affect are critical be- 
fore the findings can be confidently translated 
into specific clinical recommendations. How- 
ever, the findings offer a preliminary challenge to 
the object relations perspective that affect insta- 
bility is associated with a lack of integration of 
the self-concept and that affect stabilization can 
be achieved by interventions that help the indi- 
vidual bring disparate views of the self together 
in conscious thought, so that the self is experi- 
enced as a unified whole. Contrary to this exist- 
ing model of intervention, the findings offer pre- 
liminary evidence to suggest that affect instability 
may be reduced by therapeutic efforts directed 
toward helping the individual think of the self in 
new ways and to see this new evolving view as 
different from, rather than similar to, existing 
conceptions of the self. 
Nursing’s emphasis on working with the indi- 
vidual’s strengths rather than weaknesses in fos- 
tering adaptation to illness may provide an impor- 
tant focus for interventions designed to expand 
the existing self-view. Rather than striving to di- 
minish or change an existing negative aspect of 
the self, an important focus of treatment may be 
to help the individual identify and elaborate un- 
acknowledged strengths and abilities. Further, 
these findings suggest that an important cornpo- 
nent of the intervention may be to help the indi- 
vidual view new conceptions of the self as sepa- 
rate and unrelated to their problem areas. 
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